Comprehension
of Film Narrative
Jacek Ostaszewski Cognitive film theory assumes that the process of
understanding a film narrative consists in solving a cognitive problem, whereby
a viewer tries to construct a coherent story, grasp its direct meaning and
discover the cause-and-effect relations that govern a particular film. As David
Bordwell states in Narration in the Fiction Film, “to understand a
film’s story is to grasp what happens and where, when, and why it happens.”[1] My empirical research on comprehension of film
narrative is based on the analysis of papers written by the candidates taking
their entrance exam to Film Studies Institute at the Jagiellonian University in
Cracow, and papers written by the students of the mentioned Institute. Having
seen Krzysztof Kieslowski’s Three Colours: White (1993) and Elia Kazan’s
The Arrangement (1969), the candidates were required to write their
on-the-spot analysis of a given film (96 and 86 papers respectively). On the
other hand, the students were allowed a week’s time for writing an analysis of
Otto Preminger’s Laura (1944) (87 papers). The papers delivered by both candidates and students
are mainly of descriptive character, which results from a single viewing of a
given film. For this reason I have found the papers extremely useful as an
illustration of the process of film comprehension. Furthermore, I assume that
the ability to provide a linguistic description and to conceptualise a film’s story
is actually the ability to comprehend film narrative. I shall begin with presenting the results of my
studies on these papers with reference to common mistakes and various biases in
the film’s description, as I agree with Elke van der Meer’s statement that
“errors and mistakes in judgements and thinking processes are often far more
interesting than correct solutions, because they provide the right key to
understand the nature of human thinking.”[2] Taking into account the limited amount of time I am
given, I will not discuss all types of bias I have come upon. Instead, I shall
concentrate on those examples, which are the most surprising and at the same
time most typical of the process of constructing a cognitive representation of
a fiction film. On the example of the papers on Laura I would
like to show how the knowledge of typical film representations is revealed in
constructing a situational model; the papers on The Arrangement will
serve as an illustration of typical mistakes in the construction-integration
process; while Kieslowski’s film Three Colours: White will be considered
in the context of overinterpretation that may accompany the process of
comprehending a film, or sometimes even replace it. Thanks to its changing narrative perspective and the ambivalent
combination of realistic and oneiric elements in the second part of the film, Laura
cannot serve as an example of a typical Hollywood film; as it was convincingly
justified by Kristin Thompson in Breaking the Glass Armor (1988).
However, not many viewers can notice and understand this fact. Most viewers
perceive Laura as illustration of their own stereotypic images and
expectations pertaining to a film noir, even though they can notice a defamiliarization
device, which consists in concealing the identity of a victim and providing
a surprising solution. Preminger’s Laura is a “simple” story not because
of its form as such, but because of the viewer’s expectations that film cannot
overcome. The most surprising bias the analyses of the film
pointed to was an erroneous assumption that an ancient clock and Laura’s
portrait are located both in Laura Hunt and Waldo Lydecker’s apartments. The
authors of analyses emphasised that in a crime story certain objects become
cues or evidence in police investigation. Although the mistake appeared in four
papers only (which accounts for 6.6% of all papers), it illustrates the work of
several mechanisms in cognitive processing and understanding a fiction film. Firstly, the mistake results from misunderstanding the
shift from the film’s credits to the first scene, which takes place in Waldo’s
apartment. This must be the only explanation for the mistake. Laura’s portrait
makes the background for the credits. The credits end with a fade-out, but
before a fade-in, we can hear Lydecker’s voice over. After the fade-in, the
camera smoothly travels into a pan showing Waldo Lydecker’s living room full of
antiques, works of art and craft, and concentrates on the figure of detective
McPherson who takes a brief look at a portrait of a woman (though it can hardly
be seen, it is still evident that it does not show Laura). The mistake results from the students’ lack of
knowledge of typical conventions governing classic Hollywood cinema, namely,
the rule of “hard editing” (straight cut) within a single scene contrasted with
“soft editing” which was used for linking scenes and sequences, and as such
served as a punctuation mark. Fade-out/fade-in, which is used in this
particular case, signals a far more distant leap in time-space, because it
links the sequences. The viewer of classical Hollywood films knew that after
fade-out/fade-in it is necessary to define “when” and “where” anew. The authors
of the four papers I have mentioned did not realise how important the function
of a long and clear fade-out and fade-in was, and so they identified Laura’s
portrait from the credits with a portrait in the first scene. This erroneous
assumption is further elaborated on when in the third scene of the film the
viewers’ and the characters’ attention is drawn to the portrait itself, and the
authors jump to the conclusion that although Laura is absent from the diegetic
world (as she was murdered), we still are presented with two portraits of hers. This mistake confirms a procedural status of knowledge
on filmic forms of representation. None of the authors mention the style of the
film. It seems irrelevant to a situational model they construct for the story
told in Laura. With respect to the status of procedural knowledge,
however, the elements of style are essential for the constructing of
cognitive representation, even though they do not make a part of this
representation. The case of the four papers including the mistake I have
discussed here, seems to confirm this statement.[3] Another conclusion we may draw refers to the students’
knowledge of filmic forms of representation, or rather, we should say, to the
lack of such knowledge. It seems that the mistake committed in the beginning
has a particularly strong impact on the subsequent opinions of the viewers of a
film. Although the viewers learn the portrait was painted by Jacoby (who was in
love with Laura, which excludes even the slightest chance for another copy of
her portrait to exist), they seem to ignore it. Therefore, it seems that the
viewer is ready to verify the “strong” assumptions made at the preliminary
stage of viewing only if a film itself denies them directly and ultimately, or
if a general coherence is at stake. When trying to understand Laura, the viewers
construct the plot at the level of referential meanings based upon a model
detective story. In the case of The Arrangement, however, such a simple
model cannot be employed, as the film makes the viewer construct the story and
seek its explicit meanings simultaneously. As one of the reviewers pointed out:
“The film is dense with ponderous allegories, symbols and things which ‘imply
something’ or ‘create the atmosphere’.” The candidates watching The Arrangement were
high school graduates who had finished a course in the history of literature,
so they had no difficulty in discovering allusive constructs based on simple
clichés. Sometimes they even revealed an exaggerated urge to do so. The descriptions of the second scene of the film
included in many papers provide a clearly erroneous construction, which,
nonetheless, hilariously draws upon allusive and allegoric rhetoric employed by
Kazan. In one paper the author claims that the drivers of the two trucks
between which Eddie (Kirk Douglas) was driving in the scene of his attempted
suicide, ostentatiously smoked Zephyrs; while in fact, neither of them
smoked a cigarette; and it was a passenger in one of the trucks who indeed
smoked ...a cigar. In two other papers the authors come to an amazing
conclusion that it was Eddie himself who was driving a truck he crashed into. However, the most significant “bias” in understanding The
Arrangement is the erroneous recognition of Uncle Joe’s role (E. J. Andre).
We meet him in the scene at a hospital when Dr Weeks informs Eddie of his
father’s condition. Uncle Joe, who accompanies Eddie’s mother, awkwardly
introduces himself to Dr Weeks as the brother of the deceased, the
mistake tactfully corrected by Gloria explaining who he actually is. A moment
later Eddie talks to his father, who shows the traces of senile dementia or
paranoia aimed at his 71-year-old wife. Eddie’s father accuses her of having an
affair with an Irish lover who chases her like a dog whenever he
(i.e. father) takes his eyes off her. Strange as it may seem, in as many as 13
papers (15.1% of all) the authors identify an “Irish Lover with ... Uncle Joe!” This false construction may be the result of incorrect
assumptions made in deductive thinking. In this context the essence of a
deductive conclusion boils down to the idea that on the basis of the assumptions
regarded as true and correct, one draws the conclusion, which explicitly
reveals the information included in the assumptions. In this particular scene,
the viewer selects and verifies the elements, which are indispensable for the
construction of a mental model of a film (in Johnson-Laird’s understanding).
The information of Mother’s “love affair” is regarded as a relevant premise for
the conclusion. Then, retrospectively, one assumes that another relevant
premise may be a figure accompanying Mother in a waiting room; the figure whose
identity seems doubtful for the viewer. This reasoning is not challenged by
other elements of the scene, so the viewer simply concludes that the man,
passing himself off as the brother of the deceased, must be Mother’s lover.
This conclusion derives from two assumptions: 1. Mother has a “love affair”; 2.
There is a man accompanying her in the waiting room. What is more, the solution appears plausible, because
it helps achieve a generally coherent vision of the film. In the final scene of
the funeral Gwen accompanies Eddie/Evangelos, Arthur stands next to Florence,
while Mother is accompanied by Uncle Joe (“Irish Lover”) – in the opinion
expressed by many students coupling the protagonists in this way conveys a
clear message – although Eddie managed to abandon the old, hated arrangement,
it is instantly replaced with another one. In one paper the author writes:
“Eddie’s Mother comes with her lover to her husband’s funeral. For me, this
implies rejecting the slightest chance for the disentangling of the
arrangement.” Thus, it seems that miss-recognition of the supporting
character of Uncle Joe and his role in a situational model, is ultimately
confirmed in the final scene. In the students’ view, a new “arrangement” which
is presented at Sam Arness’s funeral, univocally identifies Uncle Joe with
“Irish Lover.” Interesting as it seems, this false conclusion, which
is crucial for the comprehension of the whole story, is not verified in the
off-line mode, whereby making it difficult to introduce and embed other
important pieces of information into a situational model. Let us take the
example of Uncle Joe’s flashback memory, which takes place when he’s playing
cards with Eddie/Evangelos in the hospital ward. In a conversation with Dr.
Weeks, Eddie suggests removing his father from the hospital. This is
accompanied by Joe’s memory - a brief sequence of several frames shot in sepia,
which show the immigrants’ arrival in New York by ship. Every flashback has its
justification. If the viewers have problems with identifying whose flashback it
is, no wonder they cannot establish local coherence. Of course, the viewers
solve the problem by assuming in the integration process that the flashback was
conceived by someone who is well-grounded in parent space of a
situational model. Some authors point to Eddie and claim the flashback is his
memory from childhood, others suggest that this is his father’s recollection.
Similar misconceptions accompany the students’ interpretation of the scene when
Eddie/Evangelos visits his dying father in the Old People’s Home. Uncle Joe
searches Sam’s jacket and tries on his shoes unknowingly confirming Sam’s
senile delusions (at the funeral Uncle Joe wears the same shoes). In one paper
the author writes: “At times Eddie compares his life with that of his father’s,
for example when he puts his shoes next to those belonging to his dad.” As we
can see, the incongruities that occur in the phase of the integration process
are solved by the viewers who try at all cost to create a coherent cognitive
representation of The Arrangement. While lowering the redundancy threshold (at least in
comparison with Laura), the film form leaves the percepts of gestalts
without clear verbal “labels” that might facilitate their conceptualisation,
which however, does not hamper unconstraint play of imagination allowing for
numerous configurations of events and characters to be tested. In consequence,
during these cognitive operations of constructive and integrative character,
certain “biases” occur. Constructive mistakes were spotted in as many as 62 out
of 86 papers on The Arrangement (which accounts for 72% of total). In
most cases the mistakes are of minor importance. However, even the analyses
based on totally absurd premises, which definitely change the plot of the film,
surprisingly manage to achieve the level of global coherence of situational
model. These papers, which indeed prove their authors’ lack of understanding
of The Arrangement as a film narrative, at the same time show that,
despite their idiosyncrasies, they follow the principle of cognitive
rationality and attach importance to coherence and logic of their argument. In the case of the third film – Kieslowski’s Three
Colours: White (1993), one of the most characteristic and at the same time,
most frequent biases was overinterpretation (in Umberto Eco’s understanding).[4]
According to Eco, overinterpretation is seeking in a film the elements of
minimal meaning and assigning them with maximal consequences so that they match
a prior premise (or premises). The viewer’s initiative in the top-down
processes is aimed at seeking confirmations for his/her hypothesis.
Overinterpretation is, therefore, not the excess of interpretation, but
actually, “underinterpreatation.” Thus, we might suggest that
overinterpretation is reading a film in a paranoid and obsessive pursuit that
the viewer takes up. What is symptomatic of the examined papers is the
viewers’ relatively poor interest in the actual contents of the film. On the
other hand, their attention is focused on the figure of Krzysztof Kieslowski as
the representative of a quality art cinema. Although the viewers understand the
story itself, they quickly abandon analysis in favour of judgment (valuation).
As a result, they often fail to see the interesting aspects of the story
itself. Few of them have noticed that the film deals with such issues as
struggle for love and understanding, or that it is extremely packed with action
in comparison with other films made by Kieslowski. Nevertheless, most students focus on “symbols” and
“hidden meanings” which – as they assume – must be conveyed by the film. What
is more, they use the analysis as a tool, which will help them find those
“concealed messages.” That is why they approach the story of Karol and
Dominique with a touch of suspicion. Even the title itself is supposed to have
a symbolic meaning, as it refers to the slogans of the French Revolution. A
three-coloured flag – blue-white-red one – represents the ideas of freedom,
equality and brotherhood. Thus, White means equality. The viewers
interpret white in various ways, referring to numerous symbolic meaning of the
colour, for instance, innocence, chastity, madness, death, capitulation,
emptiness, truth, or chill. Having established symbolic potential of white, the
students laboriously search for white elements and motives and provide us with
an endless list including: white pigeons; white tiles at the Paris underground
station; a white car Dominique drives; white snow, Marianne’s white bust; Karol’s
white shirt and T-shirt; white opera-glasses, Dominique’s white wedding dress
and veil; a white telephone Karol uses to phone Dominique; finally, birds’
white excrements on Karol’s coat. I should make it clear that among these
catalogues one may also find some sensible remarks which neglect the excessive
symbolic of the colour itself, focusing more on the colour interplay (e.g. the
use of dirty white) or on white in contrast with other colours, such as black
or red. Nevertheless, even in this area one may come upon various
idiosyncrasies. In one paper we read that the other main character of the film
is the colour itself: “white as a background for red and blue.
The characters drive white, blue and cherry-red cars.
Their sheets are red and blue; so are their toothbrushes. While
the posters at the Underground are mostly red, the light reflected in
the asphalt of the street changes it into a blue river. The walls of the
Underground are white, while Mikołaj’s scarf he never takes off is red.
In the final scene Karol stands in the prison yard, carrying a blue bag,
which contains cherry kompot and a cake wrapped in the white
paper.” The procedure of cataloguing is carried out in deep
conviction that there must some mysterious truth or Kabalist sense behind the
interplay of colours. If we analyse the conclusions that the students draw,
we discover that their imagination knows no constraints. When elaborating on
the suggested idea of equality they match quite different motives. The first
scene in which Karol entering the court building “gets caught by surprise” by a
pigeon, as one of the authors euphemistically puts it, makes him or her
conclude: “Could equality in this world be nothing but an illusion? A pigeon
flying over us in the sky – just a bird, you might say – but still has an
advantage over us. It can do to us something we cannot.” Another student
comments on the same scene: “In France even birds do not take Karol seriously.” A cognitive problem that we face in the case of
overinterpreting Three Colours: White lies in the fact that the viewers
do not integrate film “cues” in a coherent entity on the basis of data derived
from the film, as we might normally expect. On the other hand, having made a
prior assumption they begin with a seemingly “coherent” entity and use a film
form to confirm their already stated vision (with no restraints at all). The
construction-integration processes that take place during the off-line mode
of perception are here “filtered” by the clichés, which are both suggested by
the context of the film (the reviews and the filmmaker’s declarations) and by
the ambiguous form of the film itself. On the one hand, the symbolic meaning of
the colours and the idea of equality are placed on such a level of abstraction
that they do not help conceptualise the story and its message; on the other
however, the urge to read the film in terms of such a symbolic results in
overinterpretation. When considering the reasons for overinterpretation
(which obviously brings no sensible solutions – what can we learn about reality
using the symbolic of colours?), it seems that its sources should be sought in
the social reception and context of Kieslowski’s films. The phenomenon of
overinterpretation I have discussed here seems to stem from the pressure of communicative
context. The “late” works by Kieslowski were received by the reviewers with
admiration and respect, and this attitude seems to have influenced a general
tone of criticism aimed at his films, and replaced fair argumentation
concerning such issues as essential truth and metaphysical illuminations the
viewer is supposed to discover in Kieslowski’s films. Indeed, the necessity of
seeking profound truths may be partly blamed for overinterpreting simple
matters, which are actually the subject of the film. On the basis of the empirical research I have come to
the following conclusions: [1.] Film
comprehension depends on three general assumptions: 1.
The
goal assumption;
the viewer watches a film and intends to concentrate on the actions taken up by
fictitious characters in order to construct a story. 2.
The
coherence assumption; the viewer aims at constructing a coherent and
consistent semantic representation both at local and overall levels. 3.
The
explanation assumption; the viewer tries to explain the situation, events
and actions presented in a film, their interrelations and justification. Developing those assumptions, the viewer constructs a
complex cognitive representation of a fiction film one watches, and at
the same time, comprehends. Representation is the result of both a construction
process (concluding), and of an integration activity, whereby some pieces of
information are selected, while others are neglected. This is, of course,
consistent with a constructionist theory, according to which the principle of
search after meaning is a fundamental principle of film perception; while
“discovery” of the meaning is the consequence of understanding a film. [2.] The examples of possible “readings” of films show
that the lack of coherence in micro-scale (problems with categorising the
events, misunderstanding the relations among the characters) does not disturb
the coherence in macro-scale (at the level of understanding a global meaning of
a story). Problems at the level of local coherence make the
viewer impose their own structure of coherence, leading to a paradox, as the
reading of a film, however logical and consistent it may seem, turns out to be
partially a misreading, because it goes beyond the actual message of a film.
However, even in such cases, we cannot speak of film comprehension in terms of
a binary opposition of understanding and misunderstanding. Instead, we should
speak of an extent or a degree of a film comprehension. [3.] Complexity of mental representation of a film
stems primarily from an elliptic character of a film story-telling, which means
that some pieces of information are skipped or concealed, while others are
manifested in such an excessive way that the viewer perceives the events in
form of gestalts, namely, complex entities whose features cannot be
reduced to the properties of their elements; whereas other missing pieces of
information are discovered during the top-down process activating prior
knowledge. These pieces of information may also take the form of gestalts
– complex and unreducible structures of meaning. This hypothesis explains why
the same film may be received and understood in different ways by various
viewers. According to this hypothesis, the process of a film comprehension or
the process of establishing and negotiating its coherence might consist in
correlating the percepts[5]
of gestalts and emphasising these aspects which match one another. In every act of recalling, discussing, summarising or
paraphrasing a film narrative, which is a manifestation of a film
comprehension, the viewer “flattens” and functionalises a complex
“architecture” of gestalts that make up a cognitive representation of a
film and its situational model. This is achieved by updating and emphasising
these aspects of gestalts which might guarantee the coherence of the
whole structure and which are consistent with epistemological context assumed
by the viewer in order to cope with pragmatic challenges of a given situation.
The most common and, at the same time, the simplest strategy of film
comprehension is the strategy of causal logic. It is also the strategy
most film narratives refer to, thus making it even better internalised. The
viewer considers and links the events and actions of a film in terms of cause
and effect, while the clarity of this cause-and-effect relation promotes
conceptual processing and understanding of a film narrative.
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